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ABSTRACT
David Hume's main philosophical works address the 
question of how to guarantee individual liberty whilst 
ensuring social cohesion. This question arose through changes 
occurring in the mid-eighteenth century. One of the most 
fundamental changes was the appearance of a new commercial 
ideology that conflicted with traditional ways in which 
society defined itself and the role of the individual.
Hume was essentially an apologist for this commercial 
ideology and this thesis examines his attempts to find an 
answer to the question of social cohesion. Hume's epistemology 
is examined in the light of this search for social cohesion 
and this thesis argues that the credibility of Hume's 
epistemology relies on his aesthetic philosophy. Finally, 
Hume's writings on aesthetics reveal that he is only able to 
find a model of social unity at the expense of some 
individuals' liberty.
i i i
DAVID HUME AND THE SEARCH FOR SOCIAL CONSENSUS
David Hume's main philosophical works, as well as his 
political and social commentaries, show him to be consistently 
grappling with a central and ineluctable problem. This problem 
is the balance between individual liberty and social cohesion. 
The problem might be summarized by a brief question: What
model of social unity would guarantee the rights of the 
individual and the freedom to act on one's passions whilst 
also ensuring the well-being of society as a whole? This 
thesis will establish the context which defined the problem of 
social unity for Hume and will then focus on Hume's attempt to 
find a solution to the problem.
The emergence of a new and highly controversial 
commercial ethic or ideology precipitated Hume's investigation 
into liberty and social cohesion. This ideology was primarily 
concerned with the actions of the individual within a world 
defined in terms of commodities. That is to say, a world in 
which commercial transactions, profit and loss, and the cash 
nexus became the matrix by which the relationships between 
individuals, and the relationship between individual and 
society, were defined. However, this commercial ideology was 
incompatible with traditional ways in which society defined 
itself and the role of the individual.
One of the main incompatibilities was that between the 
new commercial ideology and classical republican theory that
2
3had played an important role in the late seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries. Broadly speaking, this republican 
ideology envisioned a society in which individuals curbed 
their personal desires for the sake of social cohesion. As 
Thomas Horne suggests, republican ideology appealed to the 
individual's ability to recognize a public interest and to act 
upon this interest so as to ensure the proper operation of the 
"social organism" (Horne X) . Horne further points out that 
whereas republican theory "depended on the willingness [of the 
individual] to adopt a public stance, commercial activity 
tended to change legitimate concerns for the self into 
selfishness, to enlarge private concerns and diminish the 
awareness of public needs" (Horne X) . Classical republicanism 
was, therefore, fundamentally in conflict with the very 
premises of the commercial ideology. While Hume is 
essentially an apologist for the new commercial ideology, he 
is acutely aware of the problems faced by the conflict between 
the republican model of society and a new ideology that 
elevates the passions and desires of the individual over 
social unity.
Hume's search for a model of social unity is clear in his 
main philosophical works, the Treatise of Human Nature (1739- 
40), An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748), and An 
Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751); and in 
them Hume lays out his epistemological position as well. 
Although a discussion of epistemology may seem at first far
4removed from the subject of liberty and social cohesion, upon 
further analysis we may see in Hume's epistemology an implicit 
concern with problems of individuality and universality that 
paves the way for the discussion of the individual and his 
relationship to society in An Enquiry Concerning the Principle 
of Morals.
Hume attempts to find consensus among individuals through 
an epistemology that is grounded in the senses —  an 
epistemology that values passion, or the senses, over reason. 
In Book I of A Treatise of Human Nature, the founding premises 
of the passional epistemology are found in the distinction 
between two kinds of perceptions: "impressions" and "ideas." 
(By "impressions" are meant all the "sensations, passions and 
emotions" and by "ideas" are meant the fainter images of those 
sensations and passions we generally truck in while thinking 
and reasoning [1]). The further observation that all our 
simple ideas are derived from simple impressions forms one of 
the critical tenets of Hume's epistemology; the precedence of 
impressions essentially collapses reason into sensation and 
leads to an epistemology that is grounded in the body and its 
sensations.
The appeal to the passions of man rather than to reason 
enables Hume to find a way of speaking to man's individuality 
as well as his need for social unity. In grounding his theory 
of knowledge in the body Hume has chosen the lowest common 
denominator, for the body is that which is particular to
5everyone and yet common to all. And the turn to the body in 
Hume's epistemology provides him with a general model in which 
some common ground could be found between the passions of 
diverse men. Hume's passional epistemology,therefore, 
addresses the main problem faced by the commercial ideology 
which, as we saw, was to restrain the individual passions, so 
as to prevent the pursuit of economic gain from wrecking any 
cohesive structure in which people might operate.
However, this passional epistemology may create as many 
problems as it solves in its attempt to find a model of 
consensus, for different men's passions may have no common 
ground. If so, then the strength of Hume's epistemology might 
be its weakness. Hume's epistemology suggests that the ways in 
which we make sense of the world evolve independently of each 
other through our impressions, so the passional epistemology 
is in danger of totally subjectivising any knowledge thereby 
ruining any common ground among individuals. Hume's 
philosophy is, therefore, in danger of lapsing into solipsism, 
as he suggests in the conclusion to Book I of the Treatise: "I 
am first affrighted and confounded with the forelorn solitude, 
in which I am plac'd in my philosophy" (264) . It is this 
dilemma facing Hume's epistemology that we will see recurring 
in Hume's work as he attempts to find some social consensus 
and some way to establish a firm basis for social unity.
In his celebrated discussion of causality, Hume 
addresses exactly this problem of how to find some common
ground among the sensory experiences of individuals. As Hume 
has subsumed Reason under the senses, it follows that 
causality must be a fiction of the imagination for it cannot 
be generated from any impression. The only perceivable 
impressions that we can observe in the relationship between 
"cause" and "effect" are contiguity and temporal succession, 
which alone do not account for any impression of causation. 
The only way that causal reasoning is possible is through 
experience, a position leading Hume to conclude that "all our 
reasonings concerning causes and effects are derived from 
nothing but custom" (183). So as to guarantee a common ground 
between the experiences of individuals Hume's argument has to 
fall back onto custom and precedent and consequently comes to 
nullify the more individualistic implications of his passional 
epistemology. The basis for one of the prime guides of human 
life, i.e. causal reasoning, now operates in terms of what has 
gone before and therefore denies the individual any part in 
the reasoning process. From a philosophy which seemingly 
empowers the individual we have now moved to a position that 
appeals to custom, and tradition, for its basis. So we can 
see in Hume's discussion of causality that the passional 
epistemology has difficulties in finding common ground among 
the experiences of individuals and has to go outside of the 
senses to find any consensus. In political terms, Hume's 
appeal to custom is significant for it seemingly elevates 
traditional assumptions and institutions over the concerns of
7the individual. It therefore cannot guarantee both individual 
liberty and social cohesion.
The problem of consensus raised by the passional
epistemology is also present in Hume's discussion of morality.
Morality, says Hume in Book III of the Treatise.
consists not in any matter of fact, which can be 
discovered by the understanding.... So that when 
you pronounce any action or character to be 
vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the 
constitution of your nature you have a feeling or 
sentiment of blame from the contemplation of 
it.(469)
Morality, falling within "practical" rather than "speculative" 
philosophy, is a subject that influences human passions and 
actions. As reason has "no influence on our passions and 
actions" then morality can never be derived from Reason, 
"because Reason alone... can never have any such influence.... 
The rules of morality, therefore, are not conclusions of our 
reason" (475). Reason does, however, reappear in Hume's 
discussion of morality and with its reappearance Hume invokes 
an interesting analogy with the arts.
In bringing morality into the realm of the senses, Hume 
has done two things: he has totally subjectivized the
operation of morality, for it has now become an individual 
matter of distinguishing between certain impressions much as 
in our decisions concerning sound and taste. "Vice and 
virtue," suggests Hume, "may be compar'd to sounds, colours, 
heat and cold, which according to modern philosophy, are not 
qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind..." (469).
8Second, however, morality's basis in sensation has the danger 
of allowing each individual his own moral code, as we decide 
which colour, sound, and action pleases us. The way out of 
this possibly anarchic situation is to appeal to a distinct 
and universal "moral sense" that attaches either pleasure or 
pain to the observation of certain human actions: "There is no 
spectacle so fair and beautiful as a noble and generous 
action; nor any which gives us more abhorrence than one that 
is cruel and treacherous" (470) . But as we shall see, the 
appeal to this moral sense is not without its problems as
Hume's argument is caught within the problem of how to draw
any universal inferences; the "reasons" he gives within his 
argument are going to rely on his individual impressions. We 
can see this problem emerging as Hume continues his discussion 
of morality:
An action, or a sentiment, or character is virtuous 
or vicious; why? because its view causes a pleasure 
or uneasiness of a particular kind. In giving a
reason, therefore, for the pleasure or uneasiness,
we sufficiently explain the vice or virtue. To have
the sense of virtue, is nothing but to feel a
satisfaction of a particular kind.... The case is 
the same as in our judgments concerning all kinds of 
beauty, and tastes.... (470)
In introducing the word "reason" into the above argument
establishing the connection between morality and feelings of
pleasure and uneasiness, Hume's discussion of morality is in
danger of collapsing. With the introduction of Reason, Hume
must therefore rely, under the dictates of his own
epistemology, upon his own sensations, for in Hume's passional
9epistemology, Reason is a slave to sensation. So Hume's 
argument is in danger of saying nothing as it can only appeal 
to sensation and sentiment in each stage of its conception, as 
each assertion comes full circle to rest on the thesis it is 
attempting to establish.
The problem therefore remains that morality may still be 
a totally subjective operation even with the posited universal 
moral sense. For Hume's discussion of morality, as we have 
just seen, may be particular to himself as his conclusions are 
drawn from his own feelings. The relation between morality and 
a universal moral sense can only be established through Hume's 
observations and these, of course, are founded on his own 
impressions.
As we saw in his discussion of causality, Hume has to go
outside of the senses to find any common ground among
individuals. Likewise the discussion of morality in the
Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals has to fix some
general principles which precede the operation of sentiment:
But in order to pave the way for such a sentiment 
[moral], and give a proper discernment of its 
object, it is often necessary, we find, that much 
reasoning should precede, that nice distinctions be 
made, just conclusions drawn, distant comparisons 
formed, complicated relations examined, and general 
facts fixed and ascertained. (15)
To avoid the subjectivization of morality, Hume appeals to a
"proper" sentiment which is established by reasoning. It is
essentially this reasoning that becomes the basis for any
moral judgment and so morality becomes a process of drawing
careful distinctions, and well-balanced conclusions and 
examining complicated relations. As with Hume's argument on 
causality, the appeal to sensation has to be momentarily 
abandoned so that some common and stable ground can be found 
by which actions can be judged.
We have already seen how Hume's discussion of morality
uses an analogy with the arts to elucidate his argument. Hume
continues his discussion of morality quoted above with another
example drawn from the arts, which suggests that beauty, like
morality, might also have to be properly distinguished before
it can be felt:
Some species of beauty, especially the natural 
kinds, on their first appearance, command our 
affection and approbation; and where they fail of 
this effect, it is impossible for any reasoning to 
redress their influence, or adapt them better to 
our taste and sentiment. But in many orders of 
beauty, particularly those of the finer arts, it is 
requisite to employ much reasoning, in order to 
feel the proper sentiment; and a false relish 
may frequently be corrected by argument and 
reflection. There are just ground to conclude, that 
moral beauty partakes much of this latter species, 
and demands the assistance of our intellectual 
faculties.... (15)
This is primarily an argument about morality but the example
Hume draws from the arts is important. As we can see from the
quotation above, judgments of beauty are the same as moral
judgments in that they operate on the basis of feelings of
pleasure and uneasiness. As we distinguish between virtue and
vice on the basis of our impressions, so we make aesthetic
decisions in exactly the same way. So aesthetics now becomes
a matter of feeling pleasure and uneasiness just as in the
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case of morality. But as Hume's moral and aesthetic theories 
share a common epistemology then we might expect to see them 
sharing common problems. If his discussion of morals runs the 
risk of totally subjectivizing morality then his aesthetic 
theory faces the same problem.
As with the argument on morality, Hume has to avoid the 
total subjectivization of aesthetics judgments implied by 
their basis in sensation. As Peter Jones points out, Hume has
to constantly avoid the proverb that it is pointless to
dispute matters of taste and sentiment, as Jones suggests, 
’’that view ultimately threatens not only his account of moral 
judgment, but also his central epistemological position" 
(Jones 107). Hume therefore has to find some way of
reconciling matters of taste and sentiment.
As we can see, the comparison Hume draws between morality 
and aesthetic judgment, rather than elucidating Hume's 
discussion of morality, merely replicates the problem of 
consensus and shifts the argument into the realm of the
aesthetic. The problem of finding a possible ground for 
judgment or agreement between men's sentiments or tastes finds 
its fullest exposition in Hume's aesthetic essay "Of the 
Standard of Taste." In this essay Hume seeks to find a 
"Standard of Taste; a rule by which the various sentiments of 
men may be reconciled" and with which to confront the axiom 
that to "seek the real beauty, or real deformity, is as 
fruitless an inquiry, as to pretend to ascertain the real
12
sweet or the real bitter" (2 29-3 0). As before, Hume's argument 
has a central dichotomy: how to steer between the Scylla of 
authority and the Charybdis of total freedom. A standard of 
taste must be located within the body but must also avoid an 
all-inclusive policy on taste which would disrupt any 
consensus (Shusterman 215). As Hume cannot find an ontological 
basis for aesthetic value, he attempts to find value through 
rules founded on the observations of common sentiment. So 
whilst "beauty is not a quality in things themselves: It
exist[ing] merely in the mind which contemplates them," Hume 
does attempt to find some standard of beauty through 
observation of what pleases and what does not please (230). 
As Peter Jones puts it:"it is a matter of fact that certain 
qualities please qualified observers, and that certain works 
are valued because they possess those qualities and thereby 
come to functions as models" (Jones 108). The rules which 
make up the artifact are not "fixed by reasonings a priori" 
but through observation; Jones continues, "empirically 
grounded rules have a scope of sufficient generality to be 
genuine substitutes for... a priori standards" (Jones 108). 
These rules are "founded only on experience, and on the 
observation of the common sentiments of human nature" (232).
Hume sets about the task of finding the standard of taste 
by outlining how the proper sentiments might be distinguished, 
so putting him in a position to jettison any judgments of 
taste which seem unusual. Both the circumstances and the
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"serenity" of the observer are necessary for the proper 
operation of judgment. This enables Hume to suggest that as 
"particular forms or qualities, from the original structure of 
the internal fabric are calculated to please, and others to 
displease; and if they fail of their effect in any particular 
instance, it is from some apparent’ defect or imperfection in 
the organ" (23 3). Hume follows up with an analogy for this 
predicament: "A man in a fever would not insist on his palate 
as able to decide concerning flavours; nor would one affected 
with jaundice pretend to give verdict with regard to colours" 
(233). The emphasis is on the good judgment of the observer, 
the critic, and although aesthetic judgment seems to be on the 
same basis as that of sight and smell, Hume is never able to 
tell us what rules he has managed to find through the 
observation of "common sentiment."
Before Hume is able to describe the general rules of art, 
the logic of his argument demands that he establish the proper 
position of the critic whose sentiments will lead us to the 
rules governing aesthetic objects. As we have already seen, 
illness and imperfection in the senses must generate dubious 
judgments. The qualified observer must also have a "delicacy 
of imagination," must be practiced in the observation of a 
particular art, needs to draw comparisons "between the several 
species and degrees of excellence... must preserve his mind 
from all prejudice" and, lastly, have a good dose of "strong 
sense" (234-40). As Richard Shusterman and others have noted,
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Hume's argument is circular. The argument, Shusterman points 
out, "defines good taste and art by appeal to good critics, 
but the good critics are in turn ultimately defined in terms 
of (their experience with and reaction to) good art"
(Shusterman 214) . It is the role of the good critics, those
qualified observers, that becomes so important in establishing 
a standard of taste, and it is a standard ultimately coming to 
rest on criteria far removed from the scope of the senses.
Hume's line of argument in the essay "Of the Standard of
Taste" essentially leads him to displace the whole question of
taste onto the quest for the "good critic" who sets its
standard. As it turns out the good critic is a rarity indeed,
for as Hume suggests, "few are qualified to give judgment on
any work of art, or establish their own sentiment as the
standard of beauty" (17). After listing various ways in which
a critic may go wrong, he continues:
Under some or other of these imperfections, the
generality of men labour; and hence a true judge in 
the finer arts is observed, even during the most 
polished ages, to be so rare a character: strong 
sense, united to delicate sentiment, improved by 
practice, perfected by comparison, and cleared of 
all prejudice, can alone entitle critics to this 
valuable character; and the joint verdict of such, 
wherever they are to be found, is the true standard 
of taste and beauty. (241)
But where, asks Hume, are such critics to be found? Hume
realises that he has merely displaced the whole argument onto
another level. "[Tjhese questions," he says, "are
embarrassing; and seem to throw us back into the same
uncertainty from which, during the course of this Essay, we
15
have endeavoured to extricate ourselves" (241). The search
for a standard of taste has now move to a search for the
perfect critic. But by what standard will he be judged?
Hume's answer to this is to assert that a "true and decisive
standard" exists by which we can judge the critic, one that
has real existence and is a "matter of fact" (242) . In
attempting to avoid an endlessly regressive debate, Hume has
to rely on plain assertion to continue his argument:
It is sufficient for our present purpose, if we 
have proved, that the taste of all individuals is 
not upon an equal footing, and that some men in 
general, however difficult to be particularly 
pitched upon, will be acknowledged by universal 
sentiment to have a preference above others. (242)
In his assertion, Hume mistakenly locates the superiority of
taste held by certain critics as based on a "matter of fact"
rather than in the socially determined basis of their
"preference above others" (242) . This categorial confusion
leads Hume out of the scope of the senses altogether.
The physical criteria demanded of the good critic in the 
analogy between health and sound judgment are stretched to 
other demands which have nothing to do with the senses. As 
the good critic must be free of illness and any deviancy in 
perception, so should he be free of prejudice. "[P]rejudice is 
destructive of sound judgment" and it is for the critic to rid 
himself of such influences, so he might appreciate the work of 
other cultures and ages (240). Hume seems to suggest that if 
the critic can attain an unbiased and natural perception of 
the artifact, then it is possible to establish the standard of
16
taste and to uncover the rules governing the work of art. 
However, as Shusterman suggests, the innocent, unprejudiced 
critic is simultaneously one who is educated and socially and 
culturally conditioned (Shusterman 217). A good critic, for 
instance, has to be able to compare between degrees of 
excellence: "A man who has had no opportunity of comparing the 
different kinds of beauty, is indeed totally unqualified to 
pronounce an opinion with regard to any object presented to 
him” (238).
The critic must also be well practiced in the observation 
of a particular art, so that he will "acquire experience in 
those objects [artifacts]," and ensure that "his feeling 
becomes more exact and nice... (237). So while the critic has 
tb free his mind from prejudice, he is also expected to use 
the criteria of practice, good sense, and comparison to 
evaluate the artifact. What can these be based on but a 
culturally conceived notion of taste? As Shusterman points 
out, "Hume's good critic turns out to be not one without 
prejudices but simply one with the right prejudices" 
(Shusterman 217). Hume's standard of taste has certainly found 
a "rule" by which the various sentiments of men may be 
reconciled, but it is one based on social privilege, rather 
than being grounded in the observation of the common 
sentiments of human nature.
The problem of finding some standard of taste, inherited 
as it was from the discussion of morality, has therefore
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failed as Hume is only able to find a model of consensus which 
has little to do with the senses. And as a social elite now 
determines matters of taste it must also take the lead in 
morality. So both moral and aesthetic matters, and perhaps 
even perception itself, are decided by those "good critics" 
who can conceal the direction of their own passions under a 
generally applicable rule.
Whatever the outcome of Hume's search for a standard by 
which individuals' passions and tastes can be compared, it is 
significant that this problem finds its fullest explication in 
the realm of the aesthetic. And the centrality of the 
aesthetic to Hume's philosophy is indicative of the importance 
mid-eighteenth century society accorded to matters concerning 
culture, taste, and the fine arts. The importance of the 
aesthetic was that it, unlike traditional appeals to moral 
universalism, provided support for the nascent and problematic 
commercial ideology. It is this aesthetic support for commerce 
we can see unfolding in Hume's political and aesthetic essays.
Hume sees an intrinsic link between commerce and the arts 
for they both come into existence at the same time; only when 
society progresses from the first "savage state," in which all 
have to fend for themselves, to a state where production 
exceeds consumption can society spare the people to develop 
the arts. In this way "the finer arts, which are commonly 
denominated the arts of luxury" arise (Of Commerce 256). The 
arts, in both the essays "Of Refinement in the Arts" and "Of
18
Commerce," seem to become synonymous with luxury. And in 
establishing a link between the arts and luxury Hume is 
implicitly registering the influence of classical republican 
theory. One of the central tenets of this theory was the 
perceived incompatibility between virtue and luxury. Within 
republican theory, luxury essentially meant the ability to 
produce more than a society could consume and so enabled 
labour to be redistributed. Society could then afford to 
employ people within industries or activities that were not 
essential to society's immediate needs. Classical republican 
theory saw this redistribution of labour as a profound threat 
to the state for one of the possible avenues of 
diversification might be the creation of a standing army. And 
standing armies, for Machiavelli and every republican, were an 
anathema to the well-being of the state for they pose the 
permanent threat of a military coup.
However, Hume seeks to undo this link between luxury and 
social disintegration. As he writes in the essay "Of 
Refinement in the Arts", "industry, knowledge, and humanity, 
are linked together by an indissoluble chain" (271). As the 
specialization of labour produces "skillful weavers, and ship- 
carpenters," so we will also find great poets and 
philosophers. For Hume, these developments must also make man 
more sociable, so we see "an increase in humanity, from the 
very habit of conversing together, and contributing to each 
other's pleasure and entertainment" (271). Rather than the
19
destruction of liberty arising through the growth of commerce 
and the consonant rise of culture and the fine arts, Hume is 
suggesting, in direct contrast to republican theory, that 
liberty and communitarian values actually prosper under a 
modestly luxurious commerce.
We can, therefore, see how culture and the arts are
aligned with pro-commercial thought in opposition to classical
republicanism, for the arts are capable of civilizing man and
ensuring the continuation of society. Hume explicitly refutes
the republican teleologies which saw social disaster as the
inevitable consequence of wealth and luxury. For instance,
classical republicanism constructed a history of ancient Rome
which blamed the fall of the republic on the growth of luxury.
Hume describes it thus:
What has chiefly induced severe moralists to 
declaim against refinements in arts, is the example 
of ancient ROME, which joining to its poverty and 
rusticity virtue and public spirit, rose to such a 
surprising height of grandeur and liberty; but, 
having learned from its conquered provinces the 
ASIATIC luxury, fell into every kind of corruption; 
whence arose sedition and civil wars, attended at 
last by a total loss of liberty.(275)
Hume, however, denies that luxury can be blamed for the fall
of ancient Rome, and suggests that those who construct such a
history have mistakenly blamed the disorders on luxury, rather
than on its "ill-modelled government, and the unlimited extent
of conquests" (27 6). Refinement on the conveniences of life do
not lead to corruption. In fact, states Hume, "the liberties
of England, so far from decaying since the improvements in the
20
arts, have never flourished so much as during that period" 
(276-77).
Hume makes the more startling claim that liberty in fact
rests with the creation of the merchant classes, the owners of
mobile property, i.e., broadly speaking, the middle classes:
In rude unpolished nations, where the arts are 
neglected, all labour is bestowed on the 
cultivation of the ground; and the whole society is 
divided into two classes, proprietors of land, and 
their vassals or tenants. The latter are 
necessarily dependent, and fitted for slavery and 
subjection; especially where they possess 
not riches.... (277)
This balance cannot maintain a stable society, for the
landowners become petty tyrants or attempt to assert their
independence and so fall into feuds and contests. But it is
luxury that promotes industry and commerce, and so peasants
are able to become independent, and the tradesman and
merchants resulting from the establishment of commerce
"acquire a share of the property" (277) . It is this middle
class who, in direct opposition to republican theory, provide
the firmest basis of public liberty, for they will not submit
to slavery, as will the peasants, and equally will not
tyrannize over others.
The status of this public liberty becomes clear in the 
essay entitled "Of Commerce." As we have already seen, the 
arts emerge when agriculture can produce a surplus of what it 
needs for those who work on the land. As Hume puts it: "time 
and experience improve so much these arts [agriculture], that 
the land may easily maintain a much greater number of men,
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than those who are immediately employed in its culture..." 
(256). Those superfluous hands can then apply themselves to 
the arts of luxury. Within Hume's economic theory everybody 
gains from the production of superfluities as every individual 
becomes his own middleman or merchant and exchanges his labour 
for the objects of passions; "Every thing in the world is 
purchased by labour... the superfluity, which arises from 
their [farmers'] labour, is not lost; but is exchanged with 
manufacturers for those commodities, which men's luxury now 
makes them covet" (261).
As Jerome Christensen has noted, the commercial structure 
envisaged by Hume promises gain for all in managing to avoid 
assigning loss to anyone (Christensen 19). Hume's economic 
theory, as Christensen goes on to point out, places most 
importance on the role of the merchant middleman, for it is 
the merchant's role as the mediator between economic parties 
that oils the wheels of commerce. The privilege accorded to 
the merchant is meant to rebound on Hume's own activity as an 
essayist or man of letters for the essayist is also a mediator 
in the intellectual transitions he makes between parties and 
ideas. But as Christensen perceptively remarks, this equation 
between merchant and essayist occludes "the crucial difference 
that capital (as opposed to mere intelligence or mere 
technical facility) makes in raising one economic agent to 
superiority over another" (Christensen 19). If we reinsert a 
notion of capital into Hume's economic formulations then we
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might emerge with a system that has to assign loss somewhere 
along the line.
Despite Hume's vision of a perfectly oiled economy - one
that ensures the continuous circulation of energy without loss
- Hume seems to concede that there might be some losers. For
instance, in Hume's discussion of the role of the labourer, he
establishes labour as a commodity which can be exchanged with
other commodities. However, as Hume's following discussion
admits, the fact that labour can be exchanged means that it is
also possible to exploit:
It is a violent method, and in most cases 
impracticable, to oblige the labourer to toil, in 
order to raise from the land more than what 
subsists himself and his family. Furnish him with 
manufactures and commodities, and he will do it of 
himself. Afterwards you will find it easy to seize
some part of his superfluous labour, and employ it
in the public service, without giving him his 
wonted return. (Of Commerce 2 62)
Exactly what this "public service" entails is unclear but it
is likely that it involves the maintenance of an army which,
no doubt, is involved in protecting the nation's markets -
foreign trade being high on Hume's list of priorities. Indeed
the equation between the wealth of a kingdom, its power and
the happiness of the public seems remarkably circular, for as
a country participates in foreign commerce so it builds up the
"stock of labour" which can be "stored up against any public
exigency" (2 61). Hume does not state what this "public
exigency" might be but it would surely entail any threat to
national boundaries and the nation's mercantile activities.
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The people who seem to lose within Hume's economic visions are 
those who are producing the surplus which can support the 
standing army.
In Hume's discussion of the response to a national 
emergency, we can clearly see that his economic formulations 
are going to have to assign loss somewhere along the line. 
When a sovereign raises an army, and levies a tax, society has 
to retrench, and, for Hume, those who labour in the 
commodities "must either enlist in the troops, or turn 
themselves to agriculture..."(261). Labourers might, in cases 
of national emergency, have to enlist in the army and it is 
here that loss might become most visible. As the only 
commodity which the labourer has is his own body, or labour, 
so he has to enter into the marketplace and with it all the 
vicissitudes of supply and demand. In the case of war this 
might culminate in the labourer forever being parted from his 
only capital as he is killed fighting for his country.
Hume's appeal to the aesthetic and to the growth of the 
"polite arts" as a guarantee of liberty would seem to have 
failed. For the aesthetic indeed may a measure of society's 
commercial progress, but it is progress gained at the expense 
of the liberty of others. So Hume's search for consensus, for 
a standard of taste, and his consonant turn to the aesthetic 
as the proof of liberty, has ended up elevating the passions 
of some members of society over others.
With such possibilities in mind we can see how far we
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have travelled from the basic principles of Hume's philosophy. 
Hume was attempting to find some balance between individuals' 
passions and the social cohesion that would provide an arena 
for their operation. Hume, as we have seen, never managed to 
find either a moral standard or a standard of taste, or any 
other means by which consensus could be found among the 
individual impressions of diverse men. Thus, Hume
consistently had to go outside of the body for any way towards 
finding such a standard. And as we have seen, it was the "good 
critics" who set the standard of taste and justified their own 
passions and desires under a general and universally 
applicable rule —  a rule established through the critics' 
social and economic position. So, Hume, perhaps despite 
himself, ends up condoning the passionally motivated actions 
of some individuals while finding social unity only at the 
expense of the liberty of others. And it is ironic that given 
Hume's passional epistemology the people who are constrained 
within this vision of society are those whose only capital is 
the body itself.
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